The disengagement process along the Line of Actual Control following the 2020 Galwan clash has progressed at certain friction points, but the fundamental strategic competition between India and China continues to intensify.
China’s infrastructure buildup in Tibet — roads, rail, villages, military installations — has permanently altered the strategic geography. India’s response through its own infrastructure acceleration under the Border Roads Organisation has been significant but asymmetric.
The key friction points — Depsang Plains, Demchok — remain unresolved despite diplomatic engagement. China’s approach of normalising new positions through incremental moves and then seeking to lock them in through negotiation is a pattern India must counter strategically.
For India, the primary lesson from 2020 is the need for persistent forward presence, superior intelligence on Chinese intentions, and rapid mobilisation capability — all areas where investment has increased but gaps remain.
The 2026 context — with China watching the US-Iran conflict carefully and recalibrating its own Taiwan timeline — makes this a period requiring heightened Indian strategic vigilance.